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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-3161
___________
YI LANG YE,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A78 408 327)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Charles M. Honeyman
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 25, 2008
BEFORE: BARRY, SMITH and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed: July 3, 2008
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Yi Lang Ye has filed a petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) denying her motion to reopen her removal proceedings. For the reasons
that follow, we will deny the petition for review.

Ye is a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, from Fujian Province.
She entered the United States in September 2000 and was charged under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as an immigrant not in possession of any valid entry documents. Ye
conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
the Convention Against Torture. Ye claimed that she and her mother had been victims of
retaliation by their village chief as a consequence of their refusal to support him in a local
election. On June 18, 2002, after a hearing, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found Ye not
credible, denied all forms of relief, and ordered her removal from the United States to
China. On August 23, 2003, the BIA affirmed without opinion. More than three years
later, on January 23, 2007, Ye filed a motion to reopen her removal proceedings based on
her fear of persecution in China in light of her having married in 2004 and having two
children born in the United States.1 On June 21, 2007, the BIA denied the motion to
reopen as untimely. This petition for review followed.
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of Ye’s motion to reopen. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See
Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, to succeed on her petition
for review, Ye must show that the BIA’s decision was somehow arbitrary, irrational, or

1

Both children were born during the pendency of her removal proceedings, the
second child having been born on April 2, 2003. Ye also sought reopening of her case so
that she would be unhindered in her desire to testify in support of her husband’s asylum
proceedings.
2

contrary to law. See id.
An alien must file a motion to reopen no later than ninety days after the date on
which the final administrative decision was rendered See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There
is an exception to this limitation when an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal
demonstrates that his or her claim is based on changed circumstances in the country of
removal, if supporting evidence is material and was not available and could not have been
discovered or presented at the prior hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
As stated earlier, Ye’s motion to reopen was based on her fear of persecution in
China in light of her two children born in the United States. Ye stated that she sent her
children to China for a visit with her mother, and during that visit, the local family
planning authorities learned of Ye’s violation of the family planning laws. Ye submitted
supporting materials, including an unauthenticated, unsigned notice to her mother from a
village committee in China, dated November 6, 2006. The notice stated that Ye is
considered as the subject for sterilization for having violated the family planning laws,
and it ordered her mother to urge Ye to return to China for sterilization. Ye also
submitted background evidence concerning enforcement of the family planning policy in
Fujian Province, her own affidavit, and a letter from her mother stating that villagers had
reported the existence of Ye’s two children to the village committee.
Ye does not dispute that her motion to reopen was filed beyond the ninety-day
filing period, so her motion was subject to the criteria of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The
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BIA found that Ye’s motion to reopen was based solely on a change in personal
circumstances, not on any changed conditions in China. Despite her characterization of
her position, the record reflects that Ye has failed to identify any changed conditions in
China. Indeed, Ye asserts in her brief that the evidence in support of her motion to
reopen indicates that the family planning policy “continued to be enforced in China,”
Petitioner’s Brief at 16, but she does not assert that China’s policies have changed since
her prior agency proceedings or that the level of enforcement has increased since then.
Rather, Ye’s evidence shows a change in personal circumstances that potentially alters the
applicability of the family planning policy to her. In sum, we conclude that Ye did not
sufficiently allege or establish changed country conditions in China to qualify for an
exception to the ninety-day filing requirement. Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion
in denying the motion to reopen.
We will deny the petition for review.
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